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FREEDOM STRUGGLES AND THE LIMITS OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONTINUITY 
AZIZ RANA∗
I.  INTRODUCTION: CONSTITUTIONAL OR POLITICAL REDEMPTION? 
 
In the dying days of Hosni Mubarak’s rule in Egypt, regime op-
ponents, American officials, and academic commentators began de-
bating how best to transition to a new political era.  One argument 
that gained momentum was the view that regime change would only 
be legitimate if it remained faithful to principles of constitutionalism.1  
This meant that the removal of Mubarak should follow the procedural 
mechanisms for succession established by Egypt’s existing 1971 Con-
stitution.  In the words of two outspoken and respected critics of Mu-
barak, Hossam Bahgat and Soha Abdelaty, “real transition to democ-
racy” required fidelity to the Constitution as the privileged instrument 
for change.2  Thus, Mubarak should not resign from power until he 
issued a series of decrees transferring authority, decrees that under 
the 1971 Constitution only the president could sign.  These decrees 
would “delegat[e] all of his authorities to his vice president until their 
current terms end[ed]” and lift the state of emergency that had been 
in place since Anwar Sadat’s assassination in 1981.3
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  For Bahgat and 
Abdelaty, following the constitutionally sanctioned process was “not 
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 1. Hossam Bahgat & Soha Abdelaty, Op-Ed., What Mubarak Must Do Before He Resigns, 
WASH. POST, Feb. 5, 2011, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/ 
article/2011/02/04/AR2011020404123.html.  Bahgat and Abdelaty were the executive 
director and deputy director of the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights, a domestic hu-
man rights organization that had long been a thorn in the regime’s side. 
 2. Id.  
 3. Id. 
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simply a legal technicality” but rather “the only way out of our na-
tion’s political crisis.”4
At the heart of this argument was a narrative about the 1971 
Egyptian Constitution that emphasized its pluralistic and liberal di-
mensions.
   
5  According to this narrative, when Sadat succeeded Gamal 
Abdel Nasser as president, he attempted to shift Egypt’s ideological 
orientation away from Nasserite authoritarianism.  As political scien-
tist Nathan Brown writes, “Sadat convened a large and remarkably di-
verse committee: feminists, Islamic legal scholars, liberals, socialists, 
nationalists, and representatives of the Christian church were all 
represented.”6  The result was a document that “contained guarantees 
for individual freedoms, democratic procedures, and judicial inde-
pendence.”7  It promised to weaken the most entrenched institutions 
of Nasser’s regime, particularly Egypt’s sole political party and its se-
curity apparatus.  In the decades since—so the narrative goes—there 
has been backsliding on the promises embedded in the Constitution, 
the worst example being the 2007 textual amendments pressed 
through by Mubarak.8  These amendments undermined the inde-
pendence of election monitoring, limited who could run for presi-
dent, prohibited the Muslim Brotherhood from establishing a politi-
cal party, and constitutionalized coercive emergency measures (such 
as the presidential use of reliable military courts to convict regime 
opponents).9  Despite this backsliding, the Constitution nonetheless 
embodies those basic liberal principles expressed during its genesis.  
As one noted scholar of Egypt reminded anti-Mubarak activists, “out 
of its 211 articles, only about a dozen are fundamentally illiberal and 
each of these is easily identified. . . . [T]he pro-democracy movement 
should not lose sight of the fact that the current constitution contains 
most of the liberties and protections that they currently seek.”10
 
 4. Id. 
   
 5. Nathan J. Brown, Egypt’s Constitutional Ghosts: Deciding the Terms of Cairo’s Democratic 
Transition, FOREIGN AFF. (Feb. 15, 2011), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ 
67453/nathan-j-brown/egypts-constitutional-ghosts?page=show. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. See Nathan J. Brown, Michele Dunne & Amr Hamzawy, Egypt’s Controversial Constitu-
tional Amendments, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE 1 (Mar. 23, 2007), 
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/egypt_constitution_webcommentary01.pdf. 
 9. See generally Dina Bishara, Egyptian Constitutional Amendments Passed on March 19, 
2007: Translated Excerpts, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE; 
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/appendix.pdf (last visited Apr. 13, 2012). 
 10. Hussein Agrama et al., Anti-Authoritarian Revolution and Law Reform in Egypt: A Jada-
liyya E-Roundtable, JADALIYYA (Feb. 24, 2011), http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/in-
dex/714/anti-authoritarian-revolution-and-law-reform-in-eg (quoting Tamir Moustafa). 
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Indeed, for Bahgat and Abdelaty, textual rupture at the moment 
of Mubarak’s resignation was not simply extra-legal.  It disregarded 
the liberating tools available within the established constitutional 
framework for navigating the process of transition.11  Rupture aban-
doned the rule-of-law benefits of constitutional continuity in favor of 
pure popular (or even military) discretion, in which decision making 
would occur independently of any previously agreed upon or speci-
fied process.12
But this narrative, emphasizing the redemptive possibilities of the 
1971 Constitution, faced its own powerful counter-narrative.  For 
many engaged in mass protest against the regime, the existing Consti-
tution did not embody a flickering liberal promise but rather a very 
real infrastructure of authoritarianism and emergency.  Since the 
1980s, the Mubarak regime had passed a series of oppressive laws, 
aimed at strangling internal dissent and expanding the coercive pow-
er of the security state.
  And above all, it ignored how political redemption in 
Egypt (the fulfillment of those long deferred liberal ambitions) could 
be facilitated through faith in a shared constitutional text. 
13  Such legislation placed profound restrictions 
on freedom of the press, the right of assembly, the independence of 
non-governmental organizations, procedural due process, civilian 
court jurisdiction, labor protections and collective bargaining, the or-
ganization of political parties, and the convening of elections.14  In 
the words of an outside observer, although these measures ultimately 
derived from the 1981 state of emergency, “the permissive condition 
for this legislation has been a constitution that does not protect 
against . . . far-reaching assertions of police powers and which, since 
2007, has constitutionalized the infrastructure for normalizing the 
emergency decrees through new counterterrorism laws.”15  In a sense, 
regardless of the niceties contained in the document, the everyday 
meaning of the constitutional system had been the increased centrali-
zation of presidential power, the dismantling of judicial indepen-
dence, and the systematic infringement of basic rights.16
 
 11. Bahgat & Abdelaty, supra note 
  Assuming 
1.  
 12. Id. 
 13. Charles Robert Davidson, Reform and Repression in Mubarak’s Egypt, 24 FLETCHER F. 
OF WORLD AFF. 75, 89–91 (2000); Jeff Martini & Julie Taylor, Comamanding Democracy in 
Egypt, FOREIGN AFF., Sept.–Oct. 2011, at 127–28. 
 14. See Agrama, supra note 10 (including the comments of legal scholar Asli Bali on the 
effects of Mubarak’s repressive regulations). 
 15. Id. (quoting Asli Bali). 
 16. As Nathan J. Brown remarked at the time of the 1971 constitution, “for every 
commitment, there was also a trap door; for every liberty, there was a loophole that ulti-
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that faith in this system could be the basis for building a durable anti-
authoritarian regime would be naïve at best.  Rather than a dangerous 
step into the darkness, the counter-narrative presented conscious 
constitutional rupture as a necessary prerequisite for meaningful 
change. 
One should note that the disagreement between the liberal and 
authoritarian narratives of the Constitution was not fundamentally a 
disagreement about the ultimate objectives of transition.  As de-
scribed above, both sides were regime dissidents and both were com-
mitted to the creation in Egypt of what Jack Balkin might call “a demo-
cratic culture: a culture in which all citizens can participate and feel 
they have a stake, a culture in which unjust social privileges and hie-
rarchies have been disestablished.”17  Such a culture “include[s] both 
legal rights and institutions as well as cultural predicates for the exer-
cise of those rights and institutions.”18  Where they broke ranks deci-
sively was over whether the country’s shared post-Nasser constitutional 
project could serve as the mechanism for producing this outcome.  
Opponents of constitutional continuity believed that regardless of the 
liberal narrative of the 1971 document, the existing constitution-in-
practice fundamentally constrained the normative and institutional 
tools available for transformation.19
These recent Egyptian debates speak directly to the themes 
raised eloquently by Jack Balkin’s recent book, Constitutional Redemp-
tion: Political Faith in an Unjust World.  For Balkin, the American Con-
stitution similarly has its oppressive and emancipatory narratives.  But 
in his view, citizens committed to building a democratic American 
culture should maintain faith in a collective “story about progress 
within the constitutional system.”
  For them constitutional faith 
meant subordinating the end of a democratic culture to the faulty 
discursive and structural means offered by the prevailing constitu-
tional system.  The true goal was political redemption, in which out of 
the ashes of Mubarak’s regime would emerge a new transcendent and 
liberated community.  And such transcendence required abandoning 
the hope of constitutional redemption—that is, fulfilling the deferred 
promise of the 1971 text. 
20
 
mately did little to rein in the power of the president or the country’s determined security 
apparatus.”  Brown, supra note 5.   
  Balkin willingly admits that all 
 17. JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN UNJUST 
WORLD 23 (2011). 
 18. Id. at 24.  
 19. Agrama, supra note 10. 
 20. BALKIN, supra note 17, at 49. 
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constitutions—American as well as Egyptian—“are agreements with 
hell, at least to somebody.”21  Yet he believes that the U.S. constitu-
tional project has resources embedded within it that justify an opti-
mistic orientation, an orientation that suggests “that however bad 
things are in the present” the prevailing system has the internal capac-
ity “to get better in the future.”22  Balkin’s advice to those who consid-
er themselves political “progressives” is to embrace this constitutional 
promise as the discursive and ideological means for attaining substan-
tive equality and effective freedom.  Although the actual and everyday 
constitution may be riddled with real injustices, progressives must 
hold firm to faith in an idealized document and should see the shared 
language of constitutionalism as the privileged instrument for re-
deeming political life.23
Over the following pages, I plan to challenge the wisdom of re-
maining ever-faithful to constitutional continuity, especially for Amer-
icans explicitly committed to political change.  In effect, my view is 
that the American constitutional predicament historically has not 
been that distinct from the predicament facing Egyptian activists to-
day.  I begin in Part II by sketching a counter-story of American con-
stitutionalism to stand alongside Balkin’s account.  Where Balkin sees 
the text as embodying an unfulfilled aspiration toward universal 
equality and a democratic culture, the structure of the Constitution 
also highlights a very different historic narrative: one of colonial rule 
not unlike that present in Asia and Africa throughout much of the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries.  This framework systematically 
separated between free European citizens (who enjoyed the benefits 
of full membership) and ethnically defined imperial subjects (who 
faced intricate systems of control and supervision).  In Asia and Afri-
ca, those involved in anti-colonial and independence movements be-
lieved that, given such colonial reality, political redemption required 
an explicit and formal constitutional rupture from dominant struc-
tures of authority.  
 
In Parts III and IV, I will develop this reflection by exploring a 
key era in the American past: the Civil War and the initial months of 
Reconstruction.  My argument is that the American failure to similarly 
embrace rupture and to break from constitutional faith played a criti-
cal role in sustaining practices of subordination.  Through an analysis 
of two seminal Supreme Court decisions, the Prize Cases24
 
 21. Id. at 48. 
 and Ex parte 
 22. Id. at 49. 
 23. Id. at 25. 
 24. 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1862). 
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Milligan,25
II.    OUR COLONIAL CONSTITUTION AND THE REDEMPTIVE POLITICS OF 
ANTI-COLONIALISM 
 I argue that the commitment to constitutional continuity 
actually undermined—rather than facilitated—the possibility of a tru-
ly emancipatory and anti-colonial politics.  By way of a conclusion, I 
then indicate what legal and political implications we should draw to-
day from both global anti-colonial efforts and our own Reconstruction 
past.  In particular, I argue that such experiences raise profound 
questions about the utility at all of a redemptive narrative framework 
(whether political or constitutional) and highlight the extent to 
which narratives of tragedy are better contemporary tools for con-
fronting injustice.  Moreover, these historic moments also underscore 
how, depending on the circumstances, constitutionalism may be just 
as likely to inhibit transformative change as to foster it.  Indeed, de-
spite fears of illiberality and unchecked power, Americans who are 
self-avowed progressives should be much more willing to challenge 
constitutional faith and, at times, even to advocate popular discretion 
and legal rupture. 
Balkin’s call for progressives to remain faithful to the Constitu-
tion is bound to a particular vision of social criticism.  He implicitly 
embraces what Michael Walzer has called “connected criticism,” or an 
orientation in which critics see their own views as part of an internal 
argument within the practices of a given society.  The critics seek to 
reshape a community’s institutions by reference to shared traditions, 
histories, and values.26  For Balkin, the Constitution is the premier 
American site for such immanent critique.  It is the imaginative tradi-
tion in the United States with the deepest communal resources for 
pursuing emancipatory ends.  As he declares, “the text provides a 
common framework for constitutional construction that offers the 
possibility of constitutional redemption.”27
As even Walzer notes, connected criticism is not without its limi-
tations.
  In this Part, however, I will 
highlight potential drawbacks of immanent critique in the American 
context, especially when it privileges constitutional traditions above 
all else.  
28
 
 25. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866). 
  He reminds us that this mode of critique ultimately “ap-
 26. MICHAEL WALZER, INTERPRETATION AND SOCIAL CRITICISM 39 (1993). 
 27. BALKIN, supra note 17, at 232. 
 28. See WALZER, supra note 26, at 38–40 (discussing connected critics and “two legiti-
mate worries about the connected critic”). 
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peal[s] . . . to local or localized principles.”29  The power of the critic’s 
arguments rests on her ability to “connect them to the local cul-
ture.”30  By linking the critic’s arguments to the pervasive culture, the 
critic gains the ability to make members of a society recognize seem-
ingly radical possibilities and aspirations as their own.31
Yet, at the same time, she is nonetheless constrained by the dis-
cursive framings that strike social members as consistent with their ac-
tual self-understanding.  Since traditions—even quite flexible ones—
are not absolutely open, projects of connected criticism must accom-
modate local presumptions about a community’s basic character.
   
32  
But what if a society is riddled with forms of subordination that its 
privileged members simply do not perceive (or do not recognize as 
key political and legal features)?  In this circumstance, the accommo-
dationist posture of connected criticism can have the tendency to oc-
clude, or even to erase, modes of hierarchy that—although real—fail 
to resonate with local self-perception.33
Indeed, one can argue that this erasure has been a classic prob-
lem in dominant narratives of American constitutionalism.  These 
narratives often begin from a presumption that the American Revolu-
tion should be conceived of as an anti-imperial break, which rejected 
not only monarchical power but an entire “system of social hierar-
chy.”
  
34  In Balkin’s telling, this anti-imperial and egalitarian project 
was the animating purpose behind the 1776 Declaration of Inde-
pendence, whose governing proposition was the belief “that all men 
are created equal”35 and thus equally worthy of freedom.36
 
 29. Id. at 39. 
  Under this 
 30. Id. 
 31. See id. at 44–45 (“[A]fter the new ideas have been naturalized in their new set-
ting . . . native critics . . . can put them to use.”).  In fact, this radical discursive potential is 
why, depending on the circumstances and the specific tradition being valorized, I too have 
been willing to embrace connected criticism as a rhetorical strategy for making normative 
arguments.  See AZIZ RANA, THE TWO FACES OF AMERICAN FREEDOM 17–19, 18 (2010) (de-
fending connected criticism as a powerful tool for highlighting the diversity of American 
political thought as well as “how apparently marginal views of freedom and social member-
ship are themselves foundational aspects of our identity”).    
 32. WALZER, supra note 26, at 52. 
 33. For related concerns with erasure in national identity, see Norman W. Spaulding, 
Constitution as Countermonument: Federalism, Reconstruction, and the Problem of Collective Memo-
ry, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1992, 1993 (2003) (arguing for “countermemory” as a tool in 
American constitutional practice to address issues of “forgetting,” particularly in the con-
text of race and Reconstruction).  
 34. See BALKIN, supra note 17, at 20–21.  
 35. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
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account of political origin, the Constitution and its discursive fram-
ings enjoy an elevated standing because, as Balkin writes, the Consti-
tution provided “legal and political” mechanisms through which the 
Declaration’s promise of equal liberty could “be redeemed in his-
tory.”37
 But for an entire twentieth-century black political tradition, from 
W.E.B. Du Bois to Paul Robeson to Malcolm X, such a focus on the 
American Revolution’s anti-imperial dimension undermined the abil-
ity of most Americans to appreciate the extent to which the constitu-
tion-in-practice was a continuation of European projects of empire.
 
38  
Indeed, the governing origin story obscured the real persistence of a 
colonial system in North America, organized around a fundamental 
racial dichotomy between settlers and nonsettlers.39  As Du Bois re-
marked to an audience in Haiti in 1944, colonial circumstances were 
not only those in which one “country belong[ed] to another coun-
try.”40  They also included “groups, like the Negros of the United 
States, who do not form a separate nation and yet who resemble in 
their economic and political condition a distinctly colonial status.”41
 
 36. See BALKIN, supra note 
  
This status—familiar to indigenous societies in Asia and Africa—
assumed a constitutional politics built on two distinct accounts of so-
vereign power: one of democratic consent and internal checks, and 
another of external and coercive discretion.  In the United States, 
such a dual sovereign framework served to separate free settler insid-
ers from a patchwork of ethnically excluded groups, who found them-
selves subject to a complicated structure of overlapping hierarchies.  
These hierarchies provided each colonized community distinct modes 
of governance and levels of rights, depending on internal economic 
needs and the dictates of political order.  For instance, free blacks and 
nonwhite Mexicans were formally granted citizenship but were over-
17, at 18 (“Our country sprang forth from a revolution in 
political and social structure. The Declaration explains the point of that revolution, and 
hence the point of our constitutional enterprise.”). 
 37. Id. at 19. 
 38. See RANA, supra note 31, at 329–36 (“Du Bois understood the black experience in 
the United States as a particular variant of Europe’s larger colonial legacy and thus be-
lieved that any meaningful commitment to eliminating the vestiges of colonialism meant 
supporting its elimination everywhere.”). 
 39. See id. at 114–20 (discussing how the colonial rubric “presented nonsettler popula-
tions as conquered and imperial subjects, appropriately ruled through pre-political and 
immutable forms of authority”). 
 40. W.E.B. Du Bois, The Colonial Groups in the Postwar World, in AGAINST RACISM: 
UNPUBLISHED ESSAYS, PAPERS, ADDRESSES, 1887–1961, at 229, 229 (Herbert Aptheker ed., 
1985).  
 41. Id. 
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whelmingly denied the basic economic and political conditions (like 
voting rights and easy land access) essential for republican liberty.  
For Native Americans, the reservation system mimicked structures of 
indirect rule emerging in parts of Asia and Africa.  As with some over-
seas European colonies, federal courts and administrators sought on 
the one hand to limit federal responsibility for Indian welfare while 
on the other hand ensuring that settlers possessed an overriding au-
thority to claim indigenous land or to reconstruct tribal institutions if 
necessary. And with respect to slaves, settler requirements entailed the 
wholesale rejection of any meaningful rights.42
For Du Bois and others, while the reality of American life was one 
of settler colonization, the anti-imperial narrative of the American 
Revolution meant that those ethnically included did not see them-
selves as colonizers.  In fact, most Americans viewed the very purpose 
of “founding” as a repudiation of European imperial hegemony.  If 
anything, the dominant discursive narratives made it nearly impossi-
ble for social insiders to recognize their own constitutional order as 
part of a global history, one that (regardless of British imperial rup-
ture) remained legally akin to European settler societies in South Af-
rica, Algeria, and elsewhere.   
  
In effect, American constitutional identity helped to hide from 
popular self-perception the basic nature of the political community.  
A significant consequence was that insiders, who enjoyed the privi-
leges of racial hierarchy, never perceived how domestic histories of 
unequal membership were only one piece of the international “prob-
lem of the . . . color-line,—the relation of the darker to the lighter 
races of men in Asia and Africa, in America and the islands of the 
sea.”43  Moreover, this perceptual blindness persisted despite the fact 
that the Declaration’s very text spoke to the United States’s colonial 
underpinnings, as it castigated the King for “excit[ing] domestic in-
surrections amongst us, and . . . endeavor[ing] to bring on the inhabi-
tants of our frontiers, the merciless Indian Savages.”44
In Du Bois’s view, the failure of U.S. constitutionalism to see the 
nation in colonial terms meant that it fundamentally truncated the 
dilemma of race in America.  Although dominant legal narratives in 
the twentieth century accepted the sinfulness of slavery, they essen-
tially viewed the United States as an incomplete liberal society.  As 
Balkin might argue, the United States was founded in an “ideal of so-
 
 
 42. Id. at 119–20.   
 43. W.E.B. DU BOIS, Of the Dawn of Freedom, in THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK: ESSAYS AND 
SKETCHES 23, 23 (Fawcett Pub. 1961) (1953). 
 44. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 29 (U.S. 1776). 
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cial equality,” but “previous generations . . . had realized [this idea] 
only partially.”45
According to Du Bois, the result was a vision of black equality—
prevalent in mainstream politics—that focused primarily on ending 
formal discrimination and on providing worthy elements within the 
black community with an equal opportunity to achieve professional 
and middle-class respectability.  This vision emphasized social mobility 
for black elites and inclusion for some into arenas of corporate and 
political power, but it left prevailing socio-economic hierarchies 
largely intact.
   
46  As noted biographer Manning Marable writes of Du 
Bois’s view, the mainstream civil-rights approach failed fundamentally 
to connect racial and class dynamics and thus inadequately perceived 
how “the Color Problem and the Labor Problem [were] to so great an 
extent two sides of the same human tangle.”47
For Du Bois, by ignoring the deep colonial infrastructure of 
American life, such an approach not only transformed civil rights into 
a solely domestic project disconnected from global anticolonial ef-
forts, it also downplayed the systematic forms of economic and politi-
cal subordination that marked the pervasive experience of most 
blacks (as well as most nonwhites generally).  In Martin Luther King, 
Jr.’s words, such subordination produced the nonwhite reality of 
“poverty amid plenty,” in which the condition for those excluded was 
one of “educational castration and economic exploitation.”
  
48  There-
fore, overcoming racism required more than elite black advancement, 
it entailed “a radical restructuring of the architecture of American so-
ciety.”49  As Du Bois told a college audience in North Carolina shortly 
before leaving for exile in newly independent Ghana, although the 
United States was “definitely approaching . . . a time when the Ameri-
can Negro will become in law equal in citizenship to other Ameri-
cans,” this represented only “a beginning of even more difficult prob-
lems of race and culture.”50
 
 45. BALKIN, supra note 
  
17, at 23. 
 46. See, e.g., W.E.B. Du Bois, Whither Now and Why, in THE EDUCATION OF BLACK 
PEOPLE: TEN CRITIQUES 1906–1960, at 149, 149–58 (Herbert Aptheker ed., 1973) (warning 
civil rights leaders in 1960 about the limitations of liberal integration, particularly as a so-
lution to the persistent economic marginalization experienced by the bulk of the black 
community). 
 47. MANNING MARABLE, W.E.B. DU BOIS: BLACK RADICAL DEMOCRAT 107 (1986).   
 48. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE: CHAOS OR COMMUNITY? 
112 (1967). 
 49. Id. at 133.  
 50. W.E.B. Du Bois, supra note 46, at 149.   
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The driving logic of Du Bois’s position was that, given its colonial 
foundations, the constitutional tradition was a limited site to locate a 
racially redemptive politics in America.  If anything, constitutionalism 
and its story of origin obscured the essential characteristics of the 
American republic.51  Du Bois was hardly alone in questioning the 
value of constitutional continuity or criticizing the “metaphysical . . . 
fetich-worship [sic]”52
Perhaps no figure articulated these views more systematically 
than C.L.R. James, the seminal West Indian social critic and historian.  
In The Black Jacobins: Toussaint L’Ouverture and the San Domingo Revolu-
tion, James sought to use a reinterpretation of the 1791–1804 Haitian 
slave revolt to present his own redemptive narrative of anticolonial 
emancipation.
 of the text that dominated so much of U.S. con-
stitutional discourse.  In many ways, his thoughts mirrored arguments 
developed at the time by anti-colonial intellectuals abroad, who as-
serted that the best way to challenge colonialism was to engage in an 
explicit institutional and imaginative break: to embrace legal rupture 
as the precondition for true liberation.   
53  For James, unlike the American settler revolt against 
the British, the Haitian uprising was a truly anti-imperial revolution 
premised on eliminating root and branch the colonial dynamics of 
extractive plantation-labor and racial bondage in the Indies.54  More-
over, James, writing on the eve of decolonization in Asia and Africa, 
saw the Haitian Revolution as providing a political template for inde-
pendence struggles in the mid-twentieth century.  In James’s own 
words, “those black Haitian labourers and the Mulattoes have given us 
an example to study.”55
In recent years, the closest exemplar of James’s vision of redemp-
tion through constitutional rupture has been the adoption of an ex-
plicitly post-apartheid South African constitutional text.  The text’s 
preamble highlights the fundamental nature of the legal break with 
  This template rejected decolonization efforts 
that sustained the existing legal infrastructure of the colonial state.  
Instead, it called for the creation of new constitutional orders that re-
pudiated any identitarian link with the colonial past and explicitly 
embraced comprehensive social transformation.   
 
 51. See supra text accompanying notes 38–42.   
 52. W.E.B. DU BOIS, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA 1860-1880, at 336 (1998) 
(1935) [hereinafter DU BOIS, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION]. 
 53. C.L.R. JAMES, THE BLACK JACOBINS: TOUSSAINT L’OUVERTURE AND THE SAN 
DOMINGO REVOLUTION, at ix–xi (2d. ed. 1963) (1938). 
 54. See, e.g., id. at 375 (“Those who knew San Domingo, however, knew that there 
would never be any more slavery for the blacks there . . . .”).   
 55. Id. at 375.   
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the previous order and underscores its central mission as broad-
ranging socioeconomic change.  It begins, “We, the people of South 
Africa, Recognise the injustices of our past; Honour those who suf-
fered for justice and freedom in our land; Respect those who have 
worked to build and develop our country; and Believe that South 
Africa belongs to all who live in it, united in our diversity.”56  It then 
continues by declaring the purpose of the Constitution to “establish a 
society based on democratic values, social justice and fundamental 
human rights.”57
The South African experience raises a basic question for Ameri-
cans committed to constitutional continuity: whether Du Bois and 
others may have been correct.  Would there have been an earlier and 
to date more complete elimination of colonial and racial subordina-
tion if a similarly explicit constitutional rupture occurred in the Unit-
ed States?  In the following Parts, I will return to the Civil War and 
Reconstruction period to argue that faith in our constitutional tradi-
tion has historically embodied one important roadblock to a more 
thoroughgoing redemptive politics.  This argument, and indeed the 
invocation of Du Bois and James, is about more than antiquarian cu-
riosity.  It suggests that if the commitment to constitutional continuity 
has at key moments undermined progressive political principles, we 
today should be wary of seeing constitutionalism as the privileged path 
to redemption.  Indeed, the lesson for progressives might be to 
deemphasize constitutional faith and to develop more politically in-
strumental approaches to the value of constitutionalism. 
  
III.  THE EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION AND THE PRIZE CASES 
In thinking historically about the practical consequences of con-
stitutional continuity, it is worthwhile to assess those points in Ameri-
can life when colonial practices of subordination faced profound in-
ternal pressure.  Perhaps the greatest such moment in the early 
republic occurred during the Civil War and concerned Abraham Lin-
coln’s Emancipation Proclamation, which on January 1, 1863, unilat-
erally freed all slaves in secessionist territory still in rebellion.  As 
Sandy Levinson reminds us, “the Proclamation is a most peculiar 
document,” leaving the institution untouched in Union slave states 
and “parts of the ostensibly secessionist states that had been brought 
 
 56. S. AFR. CONST. pmbl., 1996. 
 57. Id. 
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under Union control.”58  Despite its limitations, the Proclamation 
nonetheless spoke to the collapsing nature of the institution of slav-
ery.  Moreover, the Proclamation occurred alongside growing efforts 
to recruit black soldiers, including newly freed slaves in the South.  If 
the 1776 Declaration of Independence listed as one of its grievances 
the decision by Virginia Governor Dunmore to emancipate slaves will-
ing to join British forces,59 then Lincoln now was engaged in precisely 
the same practice—one long perceived as a threat to the safety and 
internal identity of the republic.  Taken together, the freeing and 
arming of the black population directly challenged the settler basis of 
American society.  These wartime practices also implicitly raised ques-
tions concerning the future status of freed blacks, namely the extent 
to which individuals who fought on the Union side would be incorpo-
rated as social members regardless of race.60
Among the most compelling features of the decision to pursue 
emancipation was the issue of its constitutionality.  As Levinson has 
discussed, the legality of the Proclamation was deeply questioned at 
the time, with none other than Benjamin Curtis—the former Su-
preme Court Justice who dissented in Dred Scott—issuing a pamphlet 
condemning it as an overreach of executive power.
   
61
 
 58. See Sanford Levinson, The David C. Baum Memorial Lecture: Was the Emancipation Proc-
lamation Constitutional?  Do We/Should We Care What the Answer Is?, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 1135, 
1139.  In the Union, the Proclamation did not affect slaveholding in Maryland, Delaware, 
Kentucky, and Missouri.  As for secessionist territory now occupied by the federal govern-
ment, it also exempted recaptured cities such as New Orleans in Louisiana as well as Nor-
folk and Portsmouth in Virginia.  Id.    
  According to 
Curtis, whose stand against Roger Taney garnered him the esteem of 
many in Republican circles, the Proclamation not only failed to ade-
quately distinguish loyal from disloyal citizens in the seceding states, 
but also entailed a theory of presidential war power so capacious as to 
suggest no meaningful limits: “If the President . . . may by an execu-
tive decree, exercise this power to abolish slavery in the States, be-
cause he is of the opinion that he may thus ‘best subdue the enemy,’ 
 59. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 20 (U.S. 1776) (“He has excited do-
mestic insurrections amongst us, and has endeavored to bring on the inhabitants of our 
frontiers, the merciless Indian Savages, whose known rule of warfare, is an undistinguished 
destruction of all ages, sexes and conditions.”). 
 60. In fact, thirty years later, Justice Harlan in Plessy v. Ferguson argued that given the 
centrality of military service to social membership it was a profound injustice that blacks, 
who “risked their lives for the preservation of the Union,” would be barred from riding in 
coach cars in segregated southern communities with whites.  163 U.S. 537, 561 (1896) 
(Harlan, J., dissenting).     
 61. See Levinson, supra note 58, at 1144–45 (“It has never been doubted that the power 
to abolish slavery within the States was not delegated to the United States by the Constitu-
tion, but was reserved to the States.”  (citation omitted)).  
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what other power . . . may not be exercised by the President.”62  In 
fact, for Curtis, since Lincoln himself rejected the idea that the rebel-
lion was legal, the domestic laws of those states remained valid and its 
citizens still enjoyed their constitutional rights.  These laws and rights 
could not be made “null and void” merely through presidential fiat.63
Given the constitutional uncertainty, Lincoln very well could 
have responded to these critics by embracing the extra-legality of his 
decision, which he explicitly did on occasion during the Civil War.
 
64  
Certainly, in Levinson’s view, the legitimacy of the Proclamation today 
ultimately rests not on constitutional fidelity but on its substantive jus-
tice—the manner in which the Proclamation signalled an institutional 
rupture from existing modes of racial bondage.65  In fact, in the mid-
nineteenth century, there existed a longstanding political tradition of 
what John Locke had called “prerogative power,” in which the execu-
tive in extraordinary times contravened the law in the name of neces-
sity or justice and then accepted the political consequences of such 
illegality.66
 
 62. PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 281 (5th ed. 
2006) (quoting Curtis). 
  Locke saw the use of prerogative as a decidedly political 
rather than a constitutional act; its legitimacy came from a public 
judgment after the fact that such pure discretion was warranted.  In 
discussing the Louisiana Purchase, Thomas Jefferson similarly in-
voked this vision of extra-legal and discretionary political action, one 
that could only be authorized by post-fact popular acceptance.  In his 
words, “The Executive . . . [has] done an act beyond the Constitution.  
The Legislature in . . . risking themselves like faithful servants, 
must . . . throw themselves on their country for doing for them unau-
 63. Id. at 280.  
 64. For instance, Lincoln admitted in his July 4, 1861, address to Congress that his un-
ilateral enlargement of the army and the navy were likely unconstitutional, even though in 
his view absolutely necessary: “These measures, whether strictly legal or not, were ventured 
upon, under what appeared to be a popular demand, and a public necessity; trusting, then 
as now, that Congress would readily ratify them.”  He continued by underscoring the legi-
timacy of extra-legal action in moments of crisis, by famously demanding, “are all the laws, 
but one, to go unexecuted, and the government itself go to pieces, lest that one be vi-
olated?”  Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session (July 4, 1861), available 
at http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/index.asp?document=1063.     
 65. See Levinson, supra note 58, at 1150–52 (“If we applaud Lincoln, it is . . . because we 
applaud his values and his political vision, not because we venerate him for any particular 
devotion to the idea of fidelity to law as a primary norm.”).  
 66. See JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE ON CIVIL GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER 
CONCERNING TOLERATION, § 160 (J.W. Gough ed., 1946) (“This power to act according to 
discretion for the public good, without the prescription of the law, and sometimes even 
against it, is that which is called prerogative.”).  For more on the idea of prerogative and its 
approach to liberal legality, see generally Jules Lobel, Emergency Power and the Decline of Libe-
ralism, 98 YALE L.J. 1385 (1989).   
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thorized what we know [the people] would have done for themselves 
had they been in a situation to do it.”67
Lincoln, however, made a conscious choice to avoid justifying the 
Proclamation as a discretionary act of extra-legal justice, whose legiti-
macy was not bound to constitutionalism per se.  He sought instead to 
read the Proclamation as consistent with a project of constitutional 
continuity.  This meant arguing that the President’s commander-in-
chief authority (as well as powers implied by the executive oath) sanc-
tioned emancipation as an expedient of military emergency.
 
68
I aver that, to this day, I have done no official act in mere 
deference to my abstract judgment and feeling on slavery.  I 
did understand however, that my oath to preserve the Con-
stitution to the best of my ability, imposed upon me the duty 
of preserving, by every indispensable means, that govern-
ment—that nation—of which that Constitution was the or-
ganic law.
  In a 
letter to Albert Hodges, a Kentucky journalist who opposed both the 
Proclamation and the arming of freed blacks, Lincoln emphasized 
that he was not motivated by antislavery ideology and acted in accor-
dance with constitutional fidelity: 
69
In response to other potential skeptics, Lincoln reiterated how 
both emancipation and the arming of freed slaves were matters of 
military judgment, constitutionally justified by the executive’s com-
mander-in-chief powers.  In a letter to be read on his behalf at a pub-
lic rally in Lincoln’s hometown of Springfield, Illinois, he wrote of 
these policies:  
 
I know . . . that some of the commanders of our armies in 
the field who have given us our most important successes, 
believe the emancipation policy and the use of the colored 
troops constitute the heaviest blow yet dealt to the Rebel-
lion, and that at least one of these important successes could 
not have been achieved when it was, but for the aid of black 
soldiers.  Among the commanders holding these views are 
some who have never had any affinity with what is called Ab-
 
 67. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Breckinridge (Aug. 12, 1803), available at 
http://www.teachingamericanhistory.org/library/index.asp?document=1915. 
 68. See Levinson, supra note 58, at 1142 (discussing Lincoln’s constitutional justifica-
tions for the Emancipation Proclamation). 
 69. Letter from Abraham Lincoln to Albert G. Hodges (April 4, 1864), in LINCOLN: 
ADDRESSES AND LETTERS 204, 205 (Charles W. Moore ed., 1914). 
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olitionism or with the Republican party politics but who held 
them purely as military opinions.70
In many ways, Lincoln’s arguments on behalf of the constitutio-
nality of the Proclamation were among the best that could be mar-
shaled from within the constitutional tradition.  In Balkin’s language, 
they spoke to an effort (however halting) to make a redemptive polit-
ical enterprise consistent with faith in the Constitution, especially 
faith in its discursive capacity to serve as a language for emancipa-
tion.
 
71  Yet, with the benefit of hindsight, one might well argue that 
the decision to tie the Proclamation to a commitment to constitution-
al continuity came at its own real cost.  First, by focusing on military 
necessity, it deemphasized the radical significance of Lincoln’s poli-
cies and the extent to which the Proclamation—as well as the arming 
of freed blacks—embodied a fundamental transformation from 
preexisting structures.72  And second, by framing the legitimacy of 
emancipation in terms of presidential emergency power, the practical 
legal precedent of Lincoln’s approach was to embed within the con-
stitutional system justifications for unchecked executive authority.73
Both consequences are exemplified by the Prize Cases,
   
74 the Su-
preme Court decision that—while not directly addressing the Procla-
mation—profoundly impacted its perceived constitutionality for the 
remainder of the conflict.75  In the Prize Cases, the Court assessed the 
legality of Lincoln’s decision, in the days following the attack on Fort 
Sumter, to pursue a naval blockade of the South even though Con-
gress remained in recess.  As a textual matter, Lincoln’s unilateral ac-
tion appeared to violate the express language of the Constitution, 
which gave to Congress alone the power both to “declare war” and to 
“make rules concerning captures on land and water” during war-
time.76
 
 70. Letter from Abraham Lincoln to James C. Conkling (Aug. 26, 1863), in LINCOLN, 
supra note 
  Yet, not only did a sharply divided five-to-four Court uphold 
69, at 195, 198.  
 71. See supra text accompanying notes 17–18 (discussing Balkin’s views on the U.S. 
Constitution). 
 72. See supra text accompanying note 70. 
 73. See generally Levinson, supra note 58 (discussing the constitutional ramifications of 
the Emancipation Proclamation). 
 74. 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1862). 
 75. In the words of seminal political scientist Clinton Rossiter, “the Prize Cases went far 
to discourage determined assaults on the validity of the . . . Emancipation Proclama-
tion . . . .  The decision . . . was a welcome addition to the arguments of the Union men, 
and Lincoln fought his war with no more thought about the Supreme Court than was ne-
cessary in making his five appointments.”  CLINTON ROSSITER, THE SUPREME COURT AND 
THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF 75 (Richard P. Longaker ed., 1976) (footnote omitted).      
 76. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. 
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the blockade, it went further and presented a sweeping theory of pres-
idential authority.77
According to Justice Robert Grier’s majority opinion, the execu-
tive enjoyed a unilateral emergency power “to resist force by force.”
 
78  
This meant that even if Congress had not provided legislative sanction 
to presidential action, in times of invasion or attack inherent authori-
ty existed within the presidency “to meet the [emergency] in the 
shape it presented itself, without waiting for Congress to baptize it 
with a name.”79  Furthermore, whether to use force in the face of 
“armed hostile resistance” and how much force to employ were ex-
ecutive judgments solely.  Such questions were questions “to be de-
cided by him [the President], and this Court must be governed by the 
decisions and acts of the political department of the Government to 
which this power was entrusted.  ‘He must determine what degree of 
force the crisis demands.’”80
What also made the Prize Cases significant for Lincoln’s broader 
wartime policies was a connected argument about the very nature of 
the Civil War.  Justice Grier asserted that while Congress “alone has 
the power to declare a national or foreign war,” no clause in the Con-
stitution gave it the authority to “declare war against a State, or any 
number of States.”
 
81
The Constitution confers on the President the whole Execu-
tive power.  He is bound to take care that the laws be faith-
fully executed.  He is Commander-in-chief of the Army and 
Navy of the United States . . . .  He does not initiate the war, 
  This was critical because ordinarily the Presi-
dent’s war powers (such as under the commander-in-chief clause) 
were only triggered once Congress had sanctioned the use of force, 
legally initiating the start of armed hostilities.  But in this context, fol-
lowing the attack on Fort Sumter, the Union clearly found itself fac-
ing a massive insurrection and thus a de facto state of war.  Moreover, 
Congress did not have the constitutional authority to declare war 
against rebelling states and thereby give the conflict its de jure legisla-
tive approval.  Justice Grier concluded that although this Civil War 
could not be “declared” through traditional means, as a matter of 
common sense a war still existed and still triggered the full panoply of 
the President’s Article II powers: 
 
 77. 67 U.S. (2 Black) at 680. 
 78. Id. at 668.  
 79. Id. at 669. 
 80. Id. at 670. 
 81. Id. at 668.  
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but is bound to accept the challenge without waiting for any 
special legislative authority.82
In effect, the President enjoyed independent constitutional au-
thority to employ military action to defeat the rebellion, even if Con-
gress could not declare war in the normal manner.  This focus on the 
unusual legal status of the Civil War was quite suggestive, especially 
for how to view presidential power after Congress finally met in ses-
sion on July 4, 1861.  Although Grier never addressed the issue, his 
reasoning raised the possibility that the President may still have had a 
legitimate constitutional basis—grounded in defensive emergency 
powers—to pursue unilateral action throughout the conflict, given its 
insurrectionary and undeclared character.      
 
One should note that these arguments, with their focus on inhe-
rent and broad presidential authority, were hardly necessary for 
reaching a conclusion that the blockade alone was legal.  The Court 
had many potential theories at its disposal.  For example, the Court 
could have conceded that Congress’s power to declare war operated 
even in a conflict with seceding states and that the President could 
not act in the absence of explicit legislative authorization.83  Nonethe-
less, Justice Grier might have contended that the blockade was justi-
fied due to the truly unprecedented nature of the particular factual 
circumstances.  As Congress had been in recess during the attack on 
Fort Sumter, it was unable to provide ex ante legislative sanction and 
the executive had no choice but to act unilaterally in order to put 
down a surprise rebellion.84  Additionally, the Court could have cen-
tered its ruling on the argument that because Congress eventually ra-
tified the blockade, this post hoc ratification legally validated the ex-
ecutive decision.85
Yet the majority did not appear interested in a narrow holding, 
one that while justifying the blockade presented the likelihood of fu-
ture piece by piece struggles over the legality of Lincoln’s wartime 
policies.
   
86
 
 82. Id. 
  Three of the five Justices (Samuel Miller, David Davis, and 
 83. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12 (“The Congress shall have Power [t]o . . . declare 
War . . . .”).  
 84. Thomas H. Lee & Michael D. Ramsey, The Story of the Prize Cases: Executive Action 
and Judicial Review in Wartime, in PRESIDENTIAL POWER STORIES 53, 56–57 (Christopher H. 
Schroeder & Curtis A. Bradley eds., 2009).   
 85. Justice Grier raised this latter point in passing, but went out of his way to state that 
such ratification after the fact was not “necessary under the circumstances” for the block-
ade’s constitutionality.  Prize Cases, 67 U.S. at 671.   
 86. See DAVID M. SILVER, LINCOLN’S SUPREME COURT 105–06 (University of Illinois 
Press 1998) (1956) (noting that the decision in the Prize Cases “would reflect upon all acts 
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Noah Swayne) were recent Lincoln appointees and Republican Party 
stalwarts.87  And, in effect, the Grier majority produced an opinion 
expansive enough to provide discursive cover to the broad range of 
Lincoln’s practices, perhaps none more symbolically prominent than 
the recent Emancipation Proclamation.88  Indeed, the status of the 
proclamation had hung heavy over the case, with oral arguments oc-
curring only six weeks after Lincoln had issued the emancipation or-
der.  Given the fact that both the blockade and emancipation were 
unilateral acts that denied southerners their property rights, as legal 
scholars Thomas Lee and Michael Ramsay note, “[e]ven a narrow rul-
ing against the President . . . might [have] call[ed] into question the 
constitutional basis of emancipation.”89
As a purely legal matter, a competent lawyer could still distin-
guish between the facts surrounding the Prize Cases and those of the 
Proclamation.  The issue posed by the former was whether seizures 
taken before Congress sat in special session and asserted its legislative 
war power were valid prizes.
   
90  The problem of how far the President’s 
unilateral authority extended, and thus whether Lincoln could on his 
own initiative pursue a blockade or emancipate slaves even after Con-
gress passed relevant legislation, was not directly at stake.  In fact, in 
oral arguments before the Court, U.S. Attorney Richard Henry Dana, 
Jr., consciously sought to limit the scope of the government’s position, 
maintaining that the only subject concerned “the power of the Presi-
dent before Congress shall have acted, in case of a war actually exist-
ing.”91  Nonetheless, the decision’s language—with its vision of an as-
sertive commander-in-chief, its rejection of Congress’s ability to 
declare war on states, and its interpretative space for a broader read-
ing of unilateral executive action throughout the entirety of the Civil 
War—made clear to observers the likely fate of any future challenge 
to Lincoln’s emancipation.92
 
Lincoln had taken before the assembling of Congress on July 4 and upon Lincoln’s con-
cept of executive powers in wartime”). 
  For the New York Times, Justice Grier’s 
 87. Id. at 114.   
 88. See id. at 117 (“The decision gave promise that any future challenge of Lincoln’s 
powers would be similarly pushed aside.”). 
 89. Lee & Ramsey, supra note 84, at 66.   
 90. SILVER, supra note 86, at 104, 107. 
 91. The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 660 (1862). 
 92. Lee & Ramsey, supra note 84, at 83.  In explaining how the ruling “took the wind 
out of the sails of potential challenges,” Lee and Ramsey write: “If the President’s wartime 
powers allowed him to confiscate the property of citizens of seceded or soon-to-secede 
states—and even of neutrals trading with those states—through a blockade at sea, it 
seemed also to encompass the power to declare the forfeiture of enemy property on land.”  
Id.   
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claim that the President had the right under the laws of war “not only 
to coerce the [enemy belligerent] by direct force, but also to cripple 
his resources by the seizure or destruction of his property”93
It is very difficult to see why the very broad language of the 
Court in respect to the proclamation of the blockade does 
not involve the constitutional validity of the proclamation 
against slave property. . . .  It is our firm conviction that the 
Supreme Court would indorse  . . . every important act of 
the Executive or of Congress thus far in the rebellion.
 settled 
the question—if not as a legally dispositive matter certainly for all 
practical purposes.  In its editorial on the ruling, the pro-war Times 
declared:  
94
Although the constitutionality of unilateral executive emancipa-
tion may have provided a central backdrop for the decision, it is not 
surprising that the Court never referenced the Proclamation.  Due to 
the legal posture of the Prize Cases, as Dana remarked in oral argu-
ments, all that needed to be discussed directly was the legality of pres-
idential actions during the congressional recess.  Still, this silence un-
derscores a key dimension of constitutional discourse—its capacity at 
times to obscure real political stakes.  In a sense, the dominant fram-
ing of the Proclamation as a question of constitutional war powers al-
lowed the practical legality of black freedom to be answered, albeit 
implicitly, in a case about the seizure of foreign vessels.
  
95  Here, the 
language of constitutionalism, rather than making explicit questions 
of racial subordination, operated to conceal from view the very poli-
tics of race.  Indeed, today, this contested backdrop for the ruling is 
almost never raised by legal scholars or practitioners when discussing 
the decision.  If anything, by cloaking the racial implications of the 
Prize Cases, constitutional narratives have had the paradoxical (even 
perverse) effect of casting slavery’s defenders as model civil liberta-
rians.  While Justice Grier’s majority opinion has been employed by 
government lawyers in the post-9/11 context to defend a notion of 
the Constitution as legitimizing nearly any act of presidential judg-
ment, it is the dissent that appears respectful of constitutional prin-
ciples and rule of law values.96
 
 93. Prize Cases, 67 U.S. at 671. 
  
 94. Lee & Ramsey, supra note 84, at 83 (internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations 
in original) (quoting The Copperheads and the Courts, N.Y. TIMES, March 13, 1863).  
 95. Id.  
 96. See Louis Fisher, The Law: John Yoo and the Republic, 41 PRES. STUD. Q. 177, 189 
(2011) (describing the persistent invocation by John Yoo and other lawyers in the Bush-era 
Office of Legal Counsel of the Prize Cases as precedent for wide-ranging unilateral execu-
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To appreciate this last point, it is useful to explore Justice Samuel 
Nelson’s dissent as well as the members of the dissenting faction more 
closely.  If the majority opinion embraced expansive executive author-
ity, Justice Nelson’s opinion spoke instead about the separation of 
powers and the liberty of citizens.97  For those in the dissent, allowing 
the President the unilateral power to initiate a blockade prior to a 
congressional declaration of war fundamentally imperiled the rights 
of free citizens and inverted the Framers’ original constitutional vi-
sion for governing warfare and emergency.  The majority’s holding 
opened the door to future Presidents invoking claims of crisis or 
threat in order to gain wartime authorities and thus subject political 
opponents to abuse and infringements of their rights.98
However prescient the sentiment, one should still note precisely 
which Justices signed onto Nelson’s dissent.  All four men were Dem-
ocrats, three of whom (Roger Taney, John Catron, and Nelson) had 
been part of the Dred Scott majority
   
99
 
tive action, including post-9/11 global detention schemes and military strikes abroad 
against suspected terrorists—all regardless of existing congressional authorization). 
 and the fourth (Nathan Clifford) 
was a proslavery politician who had previously served as James Polk’s 
attorney general.  Each was also widely believed to be suspicious of 
Lincoln’s emancipation, and indeed some worried, as hinted above, 
that if Chief Justice Taney could gain a fifth vote against the legality of 
the blockade it may well signal judicial defeat in the future for the 
Proclamation.  As Taney biographer Carl Brent Swisher writes, the 
Chief Justice certainly rejected the Proclamation’s constitutionality 
 97. See Prize Cases, 67 U.S. at 693 (Nelson, J., dissenting).  
 98. Id. (“This great power over the business and property of the citizen is reserved to 
the legislative department by the express words of the Constitution. . . . Congress alone 
can determine whether war exists or should be declared; and until they have acted, no citi-
zen of the State can be punished in his person or property, u[n]less he has committed 
some offense against a law of Congress passed before the act was committed, which made 
it a crime, and defined the punishment.”).   
 99. Although a Pennsylvania native and generally not considered pro-slavery by aboli-
tionists and the Republican press, Frank Otto Gatell, Robert C. Grier, in 2 THE JUSTICES OF 
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: THEIR LIVES AND MAJOR OPINIONS 435, 435, 439–40 
(Leon Friedman & Fred L. Israel eds., 1969), Robert Grier too joined the majority in Dred 
Scott.  Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 399 (1857), superseded by constitutional 
amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Gatell, supra, at 441.  Yet, the onset of the civil war 
led Justice Grier to view secessionists in a harsh light, declaring them nothing less than “in-
sane.”  Gatell, supra, at 442.  Riding in circuit, as early as October 1861, Justice Grier made 
clear that he would look dimly on arguments about the constitutional rights of members 
of the Confederacy and their supporters, stating that “this court . . . can view those in re-
bellion . . . in no other light than as traitors to their country and those who assume by their 
authority a right to plunder the property of our citizens on the high seas as pirates and 
robbers.”  Id. (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Smith, 27 F. Cas. 1134, 1136 
(C.C.E.D. Pa. 1861 (No. 16,318)).      
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and many suspected that if he could muster the votes he would press 
“the Supreme Court [to] declare the proclamation unconstitutional 
at the first opportunity.”100
For abolitionists, the stirring arguments about checks and bal-
ances by the Taney faction on the Court served the very real purpose 
of protecting the property rights and colonial status of thousands of 
slaveholders.  According to one Washington newspaper, in a column 
published a few months after the decision in the Prize Cases, it was ab-
solutely unacceptable for “[t]he proclamation of 1863 . . . to be fil-
tered through the secession heart of a man whose body was in Balti-
more and whose soul was in Richmond. . . .  God help the negro who 
depended on Roger B. Taney for his liberty.”
   
101
The foregoing discussion clearly affirms Levinson’s view that the 
moral power of the Proclamation rests on its substantive justice rather 
than the arguments for legality suggested by Lincoln or Grier—
particularly given the post-9/11 purposes to which these arguments 
have been employed.
  According to such 
abolitionists, Nelson’s and Taney’s calls for presidential constraint 
during wartime functioned in practice to undermine federal efforts to 
challenge the institution of slavery and to alter the racial structure of 
American life.  They sought to remove from the Union’s toolkit a key 
mechanism for ending black servitude—a strong and unitary execu-
tive.   
102  But beyond this, it also highlights how the 
redemptive political meaning of the Proclamation persists not be-
cause of—but truly in spite of—its attachment during the Civil War to a 
language of constitutional continuity.  The discourse of constitutio-
nalism in practice operated to occlude the anti-colonial power of 
emancipation and to promote arguments about executive power that 
in our own time have justified profoundly coercive measures.103
 
 100. CARL BRENT SWISHER, ROGER B. TANEY 571–72 (Archon Books 1961) (1935).  
  None 
of this is to suggest that Lincoln or his Republican supporters on the 
 101. Id. at 572 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 102. Although the exact number of individuals liberated by the Proclamation is difficult 
to establish, at least one scholar has placed that number in the neighborhood of 400,000.  
See ALLEN C. GUELZO, LINCOLN’S EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION: THE END OF SLAVERY IN 
AMERICA 214, 309–10 n.13 (2004).  It is true that Congress’s two confiscation acts had al-
ready freed the slaves of anyone participating in secession (or giving aid and comfort to 
the rebellion) who were able to reach union lines; however, these measures did not in-
clude slave owners in confederate territory who remained faithful during the war.  See 
DAVID HERBERT DONALD, LINCOLN 364–66 (1995).  As historian Allen Guelzo writes, be-
fore the Proclamation, “[e]scape from bondage was temporary and could disappear the 
moment a master showed up with paperwork in his hand, demonstrating loyalty to the 
federal government and ownership of a slave.”  GUELZO, supra, at 213.    
 103. See Fisher, supra note 96, at 189.  
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Court did not firmly believe in the moral rightness of presidentially 
directed emancipation or in its compatibility with constitutional val-
ues and fidelity.  Yet it does underline the real tensions between a self-
consciously redemptive political agenda and the desire to speak in 
constitutionally respectful terms.  During perhaps the first great 
American period of fundamental colonial rupture, the constitutional 
tradition did not act to heighten the transformative potential of the 
political moment.  Its primary effect was to rearticulate questions of 
racial bondage as those of presidential power and to re-present the 
proponents of slavery as civil libertarian defenders of limited govern-
ment.  And as the next Part explores, at a decisive time of potential re-
founding—early Reconstruction—the invocation of a shared constitu-
tional tradition did more than merely occlude redemptive possibili-
ties, it actually directly impeded change. 
IV.  MILLIGAN: REDEMPTION OR CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH?  
Today, the Supreme Court’s 1866 decision in Ex parte Milligan104 
is embraced as a powerful vindication by the judicial branch of civil 
libertarian values and constitutional constraints on wartime excess.  
As famed Court historian Charles Warren once wrote, the case “has 
been long recognized as one of the bulwarks of American liberty.”105
The case itself concerned Lambdin Milligan, a prominent Indi-
ana Democratic critic of the war effort.
  
According to current civil libertarians, where the Prize Cases suggested 
a Court far too deferential to executive say-so, Milligan indicates the 
heroic capacity of the judiciary to serve as a check on the political 
branches and as a voice for the protection of individual rights. 
106  In late 1864, Milligan was 
arrested by military officials and brought before a military tribunal in 
Indianapolis where he was tried on charges of planning to lead an 
armed uprising in Indiana to seize weapons, liberate Confederate sol-
diers, and kidnap the state’s governor.107  The tribunal found him 
guilty and sentenced Milligan to hang.108  But on appeal to the Su-
preme Court, the Court unanimously ruled in favor of Milligan, dec-
laring that the military tribunal did not have the jurisdiction to prose-
cute him.109
 
 104. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 6 (1866). 
 
 105. 3 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 149 (1922). 
 106. Milligan, 71 U.S. at 6. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 12.  
 109. Id. at 106–07.  
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The Justices, however, differed internally and dramatically over 
the actual rationale for the ruling.  Both the five-person majority opi-
nion, authored by Justice David Davis, and the four-person concur-
rence, written by Chief Justice Salmon Chase, agreed that Milligan’s 
military tribunal had exceeded the bounds of what Congress autho-
rized.110  As Justice Davis maintained, Congress indeed passed a sta-
tute in March 1863 partially suspending habeas corpus.  This partial 
suspension allowed the President to arrest a “suspected person” and 
to detain that person militarily for “a certain fixed period.”111  This 
period, however, lasted only until an actual grand jury indicted the 
individual on criminal charges in civil court or terminated its session 
without an indictment.  At that point, the President enjoyed no fur-
ther statutory authorization to hold the detainee in military custody, 
let alone to try him or her by a military tribunal.112
For Chief Justice Chase, in concurrence, the lack of authoriza-
tion in this case did not mean that Congress had no power to provide 
for the military trial of American civilians.
   
113  Congress, depending on 
the circumstances, could well issue a more comprehensive suspension 
of the writ.  As he declared, “it is within the power of Congress to de-
termine in what states or districts such great and imminent public 
danger exists as justifies the authorization of military tribunals for the 
trial of crimes and offenses against the discipline or security of the 
army or against the public safety.”114  At its root, as Samuel Issacharoff 
and Richard Pildes have highlighted, the constitutional problem for 
Chief Justice Chase was the fact that the executive was operating un-
ilaterally, rather than on the basis of clear congressional support.115
Yet Justice Davis’s majority opinion fundamentally rejected this 
focus in the concurrence on inter-branch cooperation.  The majority 
went much further, arguing that even Congress was constrained in its 
ability to curtail the due process rights of civilians.
  
116
 
 110. Id. at 108.  
  According to 
the decision, regardless of congressional authorization, it was uncons-
titutional for civilians to be tried by a military court unless the locale 
was a “theatre of active military operations” and the civil courts were 
 111. Id. at 114–15. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 140–41 (Chase, C.J., concurring). 
 114. Id. at 140. 
 115. Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Between Civil Libertarianism and Executive 
Unilateralism: An Institutional Process Approach to Rights During Wartime, 5 THEORETICAL 
INQUIRIES L. 1, 9–14 (2004). 
 116. Milligan, 71 U.S. at 127 (majority opinion). 
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“actually closed.”117  For Justice Davis, efforts to depart from the due 
process guarantees of the Constitution transformed a republic of li-
mited government into nothing less than military despotism: “Martial 
rule can never exist where the courts are open, and in the proper and 
unobstructed exercise of their jurisdiction.”118  In sweeping civil liber-
tarian language that is often quoted to this day, Justice Davis con-
cluded that “[t]he Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers 
and people, equally in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of 
its protection all classes of men, at all times, and under all circums-
tances.”119
Issacharoff and Pildes correctly read the disagreement between 
Justice Davis and Chief Justice Chase as one concerning whether the 
Court should emphasize a rights-based or “institutional-process 
oriented view” of the Constitution during an emergency.
 
120  But they 
never fully locate this debate in Reconstruction politics121 and so miss 
the heat that made the disagreement (and especially Justice Davis’s 
internal victory on the Court) so critical.  Just as the colonial back-
drop to the Prize Cases is today largely unacknowledged, so too have 
we lost sight of Milligan’s significance for the very real post-Civil War 
possibility of comprehensive anti-colonial rupture.122
In order to appreciate this point, it is necessary to see the deci-
sion through the eyes of the most intensely egalitarian among the 
Radical Republicans, Pennsylvania Congressman Thaddeus Stevens.  
For Stevens, the end of the Civil War was only the beginning of what 
he hoped would be a comprehensive social transformation, one that 
re-founded the republic on principles that uprooted wholesale all the 
settler exclusivities of American life.
  Even more di-
rectly than with the Prize Cases, the Milligan decision embodies a mo-
ment in which the language of a shared constitutional tradition and 
the commitment to legal continuity were employed to stymie a re-
demptive agenda.  
123
 
 117. Id. 
  In his view, such a redemptive 
aspiration entailed more than simply the abolition of slavery, it also 
required a long-term project of federal supervision to eliminate those 
existing modes of socio-economic subordination that sustained racial 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 120–21. 
 120. Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 115, at 13. 
 121. One legal scholar who does so is Gil Gott in his article, The Devil We Know: Racial 
Subordination and National Security Law, 50 VILL. L. REV. 1073, 1085 n.34 (2005).   
 122. See supra Part II. 
 123. HANS L. TREFOUSSE, THADDEUS STEVENS: NINETEENTH CENTURY EGALITARIAN 172, 
245 (1997) (discussing Stevens’s views on reshaping southern society after the Civil War). 
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domination in the South (and indeed across the country).124  Stevens 
envisioned a new collective order that extended beyond providing 
formal legal protections and voting rights to former slaves.125  His 
plan went so far as to redistribute slave plantation land among freed 
blacks and poor whites, providing historically marginalized communi-
ties with the economic independence and material power to enjoy 
meaningful self-rule.126  According to Du Bois, writing decades later in 
Black Reconstruction in America, figures like Stevens and Senator 
Charles Sumner of Massachusetts understood that creating a truly 
democratic system required “land and education for black and white 
labor.”127  Stevens himself remarked of newly freed slaves in Decem-
ber 1865, “This Congress is bound to provide for them until they can 
take care of themselves.  If we do not furnish them with homesteads, 
and hedge them around with protective laws; if we leave them to the 
legislation of their late masters, we had better have left them in bon-
dage.”128
For Stevens, the commitment to universal equality and the goal 
of complete anti-colonial rupture were not simply desirable, they were 
matters of essential justice dictated by God.
    
129  Indeed, Stevens took 
these beliefs so seriously that he chose to be buried in a black ceme-
tery in Lancaster as a statement of principle given the segregated cha-
racter of all the white cemeteries.130   For him, Reconstruction offered 
a revolutionary opportunity in which, through concerted political ac-
tion, the sins of American life could be extirpated and the country 
redeemed.131
 
 124. Id. at 166 (discussing Stevens’s efforts to push expanding voting rights and con-
gressional supervision over Reconstruction). 
  Moreover, such redemption entailed not only a total 
 125. Id. at 168. 
 126. Id.   
 127. DU BOIS, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 52, at 336. 
 128. See Thaddeus Stevens, “Reconstruction,” December 18, 1865, in Congress, in 2 THE 
SELECTED PAPERS OF THADDEUS STEVENS 52 (Beverly Wilson Palmer & Holly Byers Ochoa 
eds., 1998). 
 129. See TREFOUSSE, supra note 123, at 81 (noting Stevens’s view that “God had made of 
one blood all the nations of man”). 
 130. Id. at xi.  He wrote as his tombstone inscription:  
I repose in this quiet and secluded spot / Not from any natural preference for 
solitude / But, finding other Cemeteries limited as to Race / by Charter Rules, / 
I have chosen this that I might illustrate / in my death / The Principles which I 
advocated / Through a long life / EQUALITY OF MAN BEFORE HIS CREATOR. 
Id. 
 131. See Thaddeus Stevens, Speech on the Fourteenth Amendment, May 8, 1866, in Congress, 
in 2 THE SELECTED PAPERS OF THADDEUS STEVENS, supra note 128, at 132 (discussing the 
need to “clear away the rotten and defective portions of the old foundations” of the coun-
try). 
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anti-colonial break, but a break from both the existing legal frame-
work and, if need be, the very values of constitutionalism.  In Stevens’s 
view, in moments of tension, faith in the American constitutional tra-
dition had to give way to a deeper political one.  Stevens expressed 
this sentiment by calling for the long-term application of martial law 
in the South and by defending the employment of the federal military 
even in non-secessionist land.  According to him, Reconstruction, 
precisely as an epochal moment of re-founding on egalitarian eco-
nomic and political grounds, required the congressional use of discre-
tionary power—enforced coercively by the strong arm of the mili-
tary—in the service of political justice.132  Once more capturing the 
essence of Stevens’s approach, Du Bois wrote of this need to privilege 
racial transformation over constitutional continuity: “Rule-following, 
legal precedence and political consistency are not more important 
than right, justice and plain commonsense.  Through the cobwebs of 
such political subtlety, Stevens crashed and said that military rule 
must continue in the South until order was restored, democracy es-
tablished, and the political power built on slavery smashed.”133
In many ways, Milligan highlighted the fractured nature of the 
Republican Party, which as early as 1866 was increasingly hesitant to 
pursue fundamental social change as comprehensively as Stevens de-
sired.
 
134  Justice Davis and Chief Justice Chase were both close allies of 
Lincoln (the former his 1860 presidential campaign manager, the lat-
ter his Treasury Secretary).135  Justice Davis’s sweeping civil libertarian 
language and curtailment of congressional authority were understood 
by Radical Republicans as a direct assault, by a member of their own 
party no less, on the federal government’s capacity to pursue racially 
emancipatory ends.136
That decision, although in terms perhaps not as infamous as 
the Dred Scott decision, is yet far more dangerous in its op-
eration upon the lives and liberties of the loyal men of this 
country.  That decision has taken away every protection in 
  Stevens excoriated the Milligan majority, dec-
laring: 
 
 132. See TREFOUSSE, supra note 123, at 174 (describing Stevens’s policies of seizing “in-
surgent property” and “treating the former Confederate States as conquered provinces”). 
 133. DU BOIS, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 52, at 336. 
 134. Id. (noting that the more radical of Stevens’s policies “were not popular with most 
Republicans”). 
 135. See DONALD, supra note 102, at 242, 281. 
 136. See Thaddeus Stevens, “Reconstruction,” January 3, 1867, in Congress, in 2 THE 
SELECTED PAPERS OF THADDEUS STEVENS, supra note 128, at 212 [hereinafter STEVENS, “Re-
construction,” January 3, 1867]. 
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every one of these rebel States from every loyal man, black 
or white, who resides there.137
Shortly after Stevens’s speech, the Republican magazine Harper’s 
Weekly further underscored the perceived connection between Milli-
gan and Taney’s infamous ruling, headlining its piece on Milligan, The 
New Dred Scott.
 
138  Elaborating the parallel, the article declared, “The 
Dred Scott decision was meant to deprive slaves taken into a Territory 
of the chances of liberty under the United States Constitution.  The 
Indiana decision operates to deprive the freedmen, in the late rebel 
States whose laws grievously outrage them, of the protection of the 
freedmen’s Courts . . . .”139  These “freedmen’s Courts,” referred to in 
the article, embodied a separate court system established by the 
Freedmen’s Bureau during the early days of Reconstruction to ad-
dress white crimes against blacks.  Such courts were seen by Radical 
Republicans as necessary due to the overwhelming prevalence of ra-
cial animus in ordinary civil proceedings in the South.140
 Indeed, for Stevens and others, the embrace of martial law was 
not simply a defense of political discretion over rule-of-law principles 
for its own sake.  According to Radical Republicans, the problem in 
the South was that an entire colonial infrastructure still existed, one 
that sustained racial subordination and related economic hierar-
chies.
  The article’s 
author worried that since the regular courts were open and function-
ing, Milligan would operate to undermine the legality of the Bureau’s 
courts and to condemn former slaves to the vagaries of a legal system 
controlled by their ex-masters. 
141  This infrastructure was epitomized by the traditional legal 
system, whose purpose—in Stevens’s mind—was to preserve a frame-
work of white supremacy.142
 
 137. Id. 
  Moreover, ex-masters were now innovat-
ing new non-slave methods for maintaining a coerced labor supply, 
through laws like the Black Codes, and for rehabilitating the structure 
of colonial domination shaken by the Civil War.  Part of this process 
of innovation was the use of extreme violence by white supremacists 
as a tool of black intimidation and control—violence that the regular 
 138. See WARREN, supra note 105, at 154 (citing The New Dred Scott, HARPER’S WEEKLY, 
Jan. 19, 1867).  
 139. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 140. ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863–1877, 
142 (1988). 
 141. See TREFOUSSE, supra note 123, at 172. 
 142. See, e.g., Stevens, “Reconstruction,” January 3, 1867, supra note 136, at 212–13 (dis-
cussing the reluctance of the legal system to punish a white man who had brazenly mur-
dered a black man in front of the community). 
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courts, for obvious reasons, were uninterested in addressing.  In such 
circumstances, extra-legal discretion and federal military imposition, 
in the name of political justice, were essential for the fulfillment of 
equal freedom for all.  In effect, political necessity suggested that, at 
this moment of historical upheaval, substantive commitments to egali-
tarian redemption on the one hand, and commitments to a discourse 
of constitutionalism on the other, were conflicting ends in which one 
could be achieved, but not both simultaneously. 
 Today’s historians often argue that Justice Davis’s majority opi-
nion in Milligan ultimately had minimal long-term impact on Recon-
struction.143  Congress moved quickly to pass legislation that both 
reaffirmed the legality of military tribunals and that curtailed “the 
Court’s jurisdiction to hear cases involving military law.”144  Moreover, 
rather than heighten the confrontation with Congress, the Supreme 
Court in Ex parte McCardle, an opinion this time authored by Chief 
Justice Chase, retreated from Justice Davis’s judicial assertiveness and 
validated Congress’s act of jurisdiction stripping.145  As a result, mili-
tary tribunals remained commonplace during Reconstruction with 
upwards of 1,400 such trials between 1865 and 1870.146
Still, the immediate consequences of the Milligan decision should 
not be ignored.  In fact, they were not far off from Radical Republican 
fears or, for that matter, the hopes of status quo Democrats.  Refer-
ring to Stevens and others as possessed by “fanaticism,” the Baltimore 
Sun crowed that such individuals were “feeling the sting of death in 
the decision.”
    
147  Employing the Milligan ruling as precedent, Presi-
dent Andrew Johnson declared a complete halt to any trial in either 
military or Freedmen’s Bureau courts of civilians.148
 
 143. See, e.g., MARK E. NEELY, JR., THE FATE OF LIBERTY: ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND CIVIL 
LIBERTIES 176 (1991) (arguing that Milligan had little lasting effect on the protection of 
civil liberties or the construction of emergency power). 
 In the process, 
Milligan and Johnson’s use of the case ushered in the initial stages of 
legal impunity for white violence against blacks in the South, and thus 
the reformation of white supremacy under new institutional condi-
tions.  November 1866 saw the admitted murder by a white Virginia 
doctor of a local African American man for accidentally causing fifty 
 144. LOUIS FISHER, MILITARY TRIBUNALS AND PRESIDENTIAL POWER: AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM 59 (2005).   
 145. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 513–14 (1869). 
 146. FISHER, supra note 144, at 59–60.   
 147. See WARREN, supra note 105, at 160 (quoting The Baltimore Sun newspaper). 
 148. HAROLD M. HYMAN & WILLIAM M. WIECEK, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW: 
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 1835–1875, at 326 (1982). 
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cents-worth of damage to the doctor’s carriage.149  After the doctor 
was acquitted by the local civil court, the general in charge of the area 
used pre-existing congressional authorization for “military jurisdiction 
over a variety of cases involving freedmen”150 to order a military trial.  
Although this trial produced a murder conviction, Johnson, again cit-
ing Milligan, stepped in to dissolve the commission and to release the 
prisoner—taking the local court acquittal as the final word.151  For 
Radical Republicans, in the face of such impunity and the rebirth of 
white supremacy in the South, the only response to Milligan was the 
swift passage of legislation that reaffirmed military rule and, to the 
greatest extent possible, repudiated the Davis opinion.152
In a sense, the Milligan saga reminds us how the American com-
mitment to constitutional faith actually functioned at a time of real 
potential redemption.  Justice Davis was not a pro-slavery fire breath-
er.  He had been a member of the majority in the Prize Cases, the very 
decision that for practical purposes secured the constitutional status 
of the Emancipation Proclamation.
   
153  In fact, Justice Davis, like other 
Republicans, sought a meaningful alteration in American society 
along tracks more racially egalitarian than that of the antebellum or-
der.154  What he argued was that any politics of change should main-
tain faith in the Constitution and in its discursive capacities to fulfill 
even radical aspirations.  In his view, congressional Republicans had 
to reject the drift toward discretionary action and to abide by “prin-
ciples of the Constitution.”155  Explaining his opposition to the use of 
military tribunals, Justice Davis wrote in Milligan, “Wicked men, ambi-
tious of power, with hatred of liberty and contempt of law, may fill the 
place once occupied by Washington and Lincoln; and if this right is 
conceded . . . the dangers to human liberty are frightful to contem-
plate.”156
 
 149. ERIC L. MCKITRICK, ANDREW JOHNSON AND RECONSTRUCTION 458 (1960). 
   
 150. Id. at 458–59.   
 151. Id.   
 152. For a broader account of the relationship between race, martial law, and emergen-
cy in the legal imagination during Reconstruction, see generally Daniel Kato, The Legal Ex-
ceptionality of Racial Violence: Reconstruction, Race, and Emergency (unpublished manuscript) 
(on file with author); JOHN WITT, LINCOLN’S CODE: WAR AND HUMANITY IN AMERICA 
(forthcoming 2012).   
 153. See supra text accompanying notes 83–88. 
 154. See SILVER, supra note 86, at 2 (describing Justice Davis’s hope, expressed during 
Lincoln’s presidential campaign, that his victory would bring about a change in the com-
position of the Court enabling reversal of the Dred Scott decision).  
 155. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 124–25 (1866). 
 156. Id. at 125. 
 2012] FREEDOM STRUGGLES 1045 
For all the wisdom such words denoted, their political effect, not 
unlike Taney’s arguments during the Civil War, was to provide a strait-
jacket for social transformation.  Stevens’s ultimately revolutionary 
embrace of discretion did not embody a “hatred of liberty” or a desire 
for ambition, but instead articulated a pragmatic calculation that the 
best—and perhaps only—means to redemption was through discre-
tionary and, if need be, extra-legal political action.  For him, at least 
in this context, the commitment to transformation required pursuing 
actual constitutional rupture in ways that no doubt challenged the 
very legitimacy of the Constitution and its narrative framings.157
In many ways, the Milligan case is a perfect mirror to the Prize 
Cases.  Today the two majority opinions are a constantly referenced 
legal pair: the one providing a precedent for executive unilateralism 
and the other an equally powerful precedent for civil libertarian prin-
ciples.  But these decisions are mirror images in more ways than is 
commonly appreciated.  In Milligan, even more so than the Prize Cases, 
an issue ostensibly about white constitutional protection—in which 
the implications for freed blacks were never discussed—actually 
served to shift meaningfully black social reality and collective possibil-
ity.
  In 
the end, one might well ask whether the victory of continuity over an 
explicit discourse of political justice and constitutional break helped 
discursively to suppress more wide-ranging social change.  As Recon-
struction receded and political “fanaticism” declined, frameworks of 
constitutional construction provided a critical means for suggesting 
egalitarian progress while substantively cloaking the reality of persis-
tent and systematic subordination.   
158  And again like the Prize Cases, the language of constitutionalism 
in Milligan has had the long-term effect of erasing the case’s funda-
mental (and racial) political meaning from the collective memory.159
 
 157. See supra text accompanying notes 
  
If both cases highlight the tensions between political justice and con-
stitutional faith, then in their own way they each also bring home 
perhaps an uncomfortable fact for today’s progressives.  In some po-
litical circumstances, projects of social transformation may well re-
quire progressives to choose between principles of effective freedom 
and discourses of constitutionalism.  In the final pages, I plan to ex-
plore what to make of this tension and what conclusions to draw from 
the broader account of the Civil War and early Reconstruction. 
123–124. 
 158. See supra Part IV. 
 159. See supra Part II. 
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V.    CONCLUSION: DEMOCRATIC DISCRETION AND NARRATIVES OF 
TRAGEDY 
The preceding Parts have sought to highlight two claims about 
the ties between freedom struggles and constitutional discourses in 
America.  First, they attempted to remind readers that a long black 
political tradition, consciously linked to global independence move-
ments, questioned the very compatibility between redemptive anti-
colonial aspirations and either constitutional faith or continuity.  
Second, such discussions emphasized that at two decisive moments of 
potential anti-colonial rupture in the United States, the resort to 
frameworks of constitutional construction hindered as much as they 
assisted meaningful change.  These two claims suggest a lesson and a 
caution for contemporary progressives committed to fulfilling goals of 
equal and effective freedom.  The lesson is that progressives should 
be less afraid of political discretion and more instrumental in their 
endorsement of constitutional principles and languages.  The caution 
is that the repeated historic inadequacies of redemptive enterprises—
whether here at home or as part of Third World anti-colonial projects 
abroad—raise doubts about the continuing utility of such narratives 
of redemption (be they political or constitutional).   
Let me begin by developing what I take to be the lesson of the 
historical examples.  In many ways, Stevens and the most egalitarian 
among the Radical Republicans were generating in the first months of 
Reconstruction a vision of Congress as an instrument for exercising 
what Emmanuel Sieyès famously described as “constituent power.”160  
By this, Sieyès had in mind the sovereign authority that creates and 
thus precedes any instituted government.  Such power was both dem-
ocratic and legitimate because it expressed the national will of the 
people as a whole.  In his view, government and its constituted powers 
were justified only to the extent that they remained “faithful to the 
laws imposed upon [them].  The national will, on the other hand, 
simply needs the reality of its existence to be legal.  It is the origin of 
all legality.”161  At a moment of collective re-founding, Stevens sought 
to employ congressional discretion and military authority as constitu-
ent tools for transforming the basic character of American life—to act 
outside the bounds of ordinary legality in order to regenerate legal 
norms.162
 
 160. See Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès, What is the Third Estate?, in POLITICAL WRITINGS 93, 
136 (Michael Sonenscher ed., 2003). 
   
 161. Id. at 137. 
 162. See supra text accompanying notes 123–124. 
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Ultimately, one could argue that the failure of Radical Recon-
struction derived from the inability of Stevens and his allies to build a 
large enough popular base for these goals.  Radical Republicans had 
hoped that by extending political and economic power to freed slaves 
in the South (their natural allies in the former Confederacy) they 
would be able to create an interracial and truly national Republican 
majority.  But unfortunately, Stevens’s vision of an anti-colonial and 
racially egalitarian republic remained a minority perspective in the 
North as much as in the South.  Stevens’s assertion of constituent 
power therefore carried with it for many white Americans (who re-
mained committed to a racially defined republic) the taint of political 
vanguardism.  Nonetheless, his efforts and those of other Republicans 
during Reconstruction offer a powerful contemporary lesson.  They 
suggest how political discretion—if exercised on behalf of a broad 
constituency, one able to provide such practices with widespread 
popular legitimacy—has the potential to be both transformative and 
democratic.    
Today, for many progressives (inside and outside of the legal 
community) discretionary authority is almost always associated with 
concerns about a usurpatory and “imperial”163 presidency, while its 
democratic potential is hardly ever defended.  Not unlike those Egyp-
tian activists who called for fidelity to the existing 1971 Constitution—
regardless of its limitations—the thought is that constitutionalism 
protects the rights of the weak and that discretion enhances the pow-
er of despots.164  Given the legal specter of Schmittian dictatorship 
and the historical experience of totalitarianism, these fears are not to 
be taken lightly.  In the words of one such progressive scholar, “the 
arbitrary character . . . of constituent power” must be avoided because 
it “is where the law ends, and pure politics (or war) begins.”165
 
 163. The term itself was famously coined by Arthur Schlesinger to describe presidential 
leadership during the era of Watergate and Vietnam.  Writing of executive authority in 
1973, he concluded that: “in our own time it has produced a conception of presidential 
power so spacious and peremptory as to imply a radical transformation of the traditional 
polity. . . . The constitutional Presidency . . . has become the imperial Presidency and 
threatens to be the revolutionary Presidency.”  ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE 
IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY, at viii (1973). 
  At the 
same time, however, the Egyptian example also indicates that the 
progressive embrace of constitutional fidelity, as well as related dis-
courses of shared tradition, may have their own pathologies.  As the 
Mubarak regime exposed, instituted processes can themselves be 
deeply oppressive and, by contrast, the popular and extra-legal discre-
 164. See supra text accompanying notes 1–12. 
 165. 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 11 (1998). 
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tion of mass constituents can serve anti-authoritarian ends.166
More relevantly for the American case, the story of Thaddeus 
Stevens and David Davis indicates that progressive orientations to 
constitutional faith should be assessed pragmatically.
  In oth-
er words, depending on the political conditions, constituent power 
may well be generative and democratic rather than despotic.  At the 
same time, constitutionalism and frameworks of constitutional con-
struction can simply promote a coercive rule-by-law. 
167  Not only has 
the constitution-in-practice been riddled with injustice, as Balkin po-
werfully illuminates, but the Constitution’s discursive structures have 
not been an unalloyed blessing for the freedom struggles of the 
past.168
Such a call for progressives to be less tradition-bound and more 
willing to embrace constituent power (not to mention its very real po-
litical dangers) comes with a final note of caution.  Twentieth century 
projects of redemption, both revolutionary anti-colonial ones and 
those grounded in constitutional faith, have all participated in a par-
ticular type of emancipatory history.  As theorist David Scott writes, 
these redemptive accounts embrace a narrative structure of “rom-
ance.”
  Indeed, there is no reason to believe that although the radical 
potential of previous movements may have been hindered—at the 
most crucial moments—by the focus on constitutional narrative, simi-
lar fates will not befall future efforts.  If the goal of progressives is a 
transformative and ultimately political one, faith should reside in the 
ideal of effective and equal freedom alone.  This preeminent com-
mitment may require both a politics of constitutional construction as 
well as one of constitutional rupture (the latter through democratic 
discretion).  In a sense, progressive political faith should view its rela-
tionship to traditions, including constitutional ones, strategically—to 
be asserted when it serves emancipatory purposes and questioned or 
even rejected when it does not. 
169  They have presented “narratives of overcoming, often narra-
tives of vindication; they have tended to enact a distinctive rhythm 
and pacing, a distinctive direction, and to tell stories of salvation.”170
 
 166. See supra text accompanying notes 
  
Above all, they have posited a future in which individuals can tran-
scend oppression and unshackle freedom from existing modes of 
subordination once and for all.   
13–14. 
 167. See supra Part IV. 
 168. See supra text accompanying notes 17–23. 
 169. DAVID SCOTT, CONSCRIPTS OF MODERNITY: THE TRAGEDY OF COLONIAL 
ENLIGHTENMENT 7 (2004). 
 170. Id. at 7–8. 
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Still, the contemporary moment, both in the United States and in 
the wider postcolonial world, has been marked by far greater histori-
cal complication.  Post-apartheid South Africa offers just one telling 
illustration.  The South African struggle embodied a classic story of 
anti-colonial redemption, complete with a revolutionary re-founding 
and a fundamental constitutional rupture.171  Yet, the postcolonial 
present in South Africa is much more equivocal than straightforward-
ly redemptive.  Although constitutionally premised on racial equality, 
the country remains riddled with extreme economic hierarchies that 
are the persistent legacy of apartheid.172  In fact, the National Party’s 
willingness in the early 1990s to relinquish political authority was tied 
to key compromises made by the African National Congress, particu-
larly to refrain from expropriating or dramatically curtailing white 
economic power in the country.173  In a sense, the South African re-
demptive narrative of revolutionary change and salvation—
highlighted by a glowing preamble—belies a more uncertain story of 
both rupture and structural continuity, in which even explicit consti-
tutional rejection has hardly assured a future of meaningful racial 
equality.  Similarly, in the United States, the twentieth century’s great 
redemptive social movements—on behalf of organized labor, black 
freedom, and women’s equality—have transformed the political ter-
rain but have also either receded in social power or left us with com-
plex presents, marked by the overlap between formal equalities and 
substantive injustices.  As Scott suggests, the twentieth century rom-
ance of redemption and untainted emancipation is now in many ways 
“a superseded future, one of our futures past.”174
The response among progressives should not be to give up gen-
erally on a utopian imagination.  But it does suggest the value of bind-
ing this imagination to historical narratives of tragedy rather than to 
those of redemption or romance.  By tragedy, I do not mean the no-
tion that “due to some flaw or defect” our political and constitutional 
frameworks will necessarily commit us “to a disastrous course of ac-
  
 
 171. See Makau wa Mutua, Hope and Despair for a New South Africa: The Limits of Rights Dis-
course, 10 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 63, 65–66 (1997) (describing South Africa’s new constitu-
tional order post-apartheid). 
 172. Id. at 68. 
 173. For more on the persistence of the old social order in post-apartheid South Africa, 
see GARY JEFFREY JACOBSOHN, CONSTITUTIONAL IDENTITY 123 (2010) (describing the con-
stitution-making process in South Africa as a way to achieve democratic rule while also “as-
suring the white minority that democratic rule would not simply be an invitation to majori-
tarian retribution”); Mutua, supra note 171, at 81 (noting “that the [National Party] got 
the better of the deal as it was protected against the will of the majority to substantially 
transform the state”). 
 174. SCOTT, supra note 169, at 210. 
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tion” that produces “great suffering and severe punishment.”175
[T]ragedy sets before us the image of a man or woman ob-
liged to act in a world in which values are unstable and am-
biguous. . . . [F]or tragedy the relation between past, 
present, and future is . . . a broken series of paradoxes and 
reversals in which human action is ever open to unaccount-
able contingencies—and luck.
  In-
stead, I mean the idea, certainly embedded in the concept of a tragic 
flaw, that historical moments are marked by linked and mutually con-
stitutive relationships of freedom and subordination.  In describing 
the tragedy in the postcolonial predicament, Scott writes: 
176
Thus, every political period, be it the Civil War, Reconstruction, 
or the current-day, presents its own hierarchies and dependencies.  
The goal of progressive action is to uncover those forms of depen-
dence and to strive for liberation from them.  But even successful 
projects of emancipation will produce their own “unaccountable con-
tingencies” and generate new legal and political orders that knit to-
gether secured freedoms with emerging hierarchies, as post-apartheid 
South Africa and contemporary America suggest.  This is the paradox 
of tragedy.  It offers a narrative in which the struggle for emancipa-
tion is a ceaseless one, requiring an aspiration to utopia but never ca-
pable of being completely redeemed in history—as total emancipa-
tion is always and permanently beyond reach.   
    
Besides speaking to the complexity of our postcolonial and post-
civil rights times, such a narrative of tragedy better addresses the cur-
rent moment in two ways.  First, unlike stories of redemption, it pro-
vides a greater bulwark against the inclination to rationalize the injus-
tices of the present, especially by acceding to a Whiggish faith in 
progress.  Redemption stories, as Balkin himself recognizes and criti-
ques,177
 
 175. BALKIN, supra note 
 have the tendency to read history as a long-term trend toward 
justice, albeit halting and uneven.  At a time when old forms of sub-
ordination persist in the United States and yet we see sustained back-
sliding from the very achievements of previous eras, a tragic narrative 
frontally challenges the complacent willingness to believe that condi-
tions are “good enough.”  It does so by reminding us to be on conti-
nuous guard against the hidden and unwitting forms of domination 
17, at 81. 
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embedded in our social practices, even in those practices—like consti-
tutional construction and veneration—that we collectively esteem.   
Second, and finally, an adequately tragic sensibility helps pro-
gressives to reclaim a space in their political imagination for demo-
cratic discretion.  The grave problem of past revolutionary agendas 
(anti-colonial or otherwise) was a failure to appreciate fully the de-
structive violence generated by radical change.  But if constitutional 
rupture must still be part of the progressive toolkit, an awareness of 
the tragic has the potential to cabin the worst consequences of discre-
tion.  Tragic discourse, by emphasizing the ambiguous nature of any 
transformative project, suggests its own ethic of political responsibili-
ty.  Such a narrative makes ever-present the potential costs wrought by 
legal rupture and compels progressive actors to appreciate the politi-
cal stakes when breaking from constitutional fidelity.  A tragic sensi-
bility demands of progressives both that they aggressively assert eman-
cipatory commitments and that they embrace judicious political 
ethics.  Ultimately, it imagines an orientation to collective life ani-
mated by justice but tempered by the recognition of indissoluble pa-
radox.  
